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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHILIPPINES’ ANTI-
TERROR LAW—SUAVITER IN MODO, FORTITER IN RE1 
 
Brent H. Lyew† 
Abstract:  The Philippines is rife with competing struggles for rights of self-
determination and international terrorist networks.  For years, the Philippine government 
prosecuted suspected terrorists without an anti-terror law.  The absence of an express 
criminal violation for acts of terrorism led to a blurred distinction between punishing 
terrorists and punishing secessionists.  Responding to public outcry that the Philippine 
government was violating human rights by punishing secessionists unjustly, the United 
Nations conducted an investigation.  This investigation led to the placement of the 
Philippine government on the United Nations’ human rights watch list.  The Philippine 
legislature, shortly thereafter, passed the Human Security Act of 2007 (“HSA”).  This law 
codified the acts punishable as crimes of terrorism.  Since the HSA’s passage, five 
prominent advocacy groups petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to strike down the 
anti-terror law as unconstitutional for being overly vague and unjustly intruding on 
individual rights.  This comment analyzes the lawfulness of the HSA.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism plagues the Philippines.  On May 23, 1976, six hijackers 
took control of a commercial airliner and, after demands were not met, 
detonated grenades that exploded the plane on a runway in the Philippines.2  
This hijacking was one of the Philippines’ earliest terror attacks that incurred 
international reverberations.3  International terrorists soon after infiltrated 
the Philippines and established operational networks.4  Attacks escalated5  In 
1991, terrorists attempted to bomb the United States’ (“U.S.”) embassy in 
                                                 
† Juris Doctor expected 2010.  The author would like to thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal and Prof. Joel Ngugi for his guidance in the development of this comment.  .  
1  Latin for: “Gently in manner, strongly in deed.”  OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (P.G.W. Glare ed. 
1982).  Letter from Lord Chesterfield to his son, in Henry Belfield, Lord Chesterfield's Letters To His Son 
and Godson, Selected, at 125-26 (1897) (“The suaviter in modo alone would degenerate and sink into a 
mean, timid complaisance and passiveness, if not supported and dignified by the fortiter in re, which would 
also run into impetuosity and brutality, if not tempered and softened by the suaviter in modo: however, they 
are seldom united.”)… 
2 Aviation Safety Network, Hijacking Description: 23 May 1976, http://aviation-
safety.net/database/record.php?id=19760523-1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
3 See ROMULO C. SUPAPO, U.S.-PHILIPPINE SECURITY RELATIONS:  ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 2 (2004), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424307&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
4 Id. at 5. 
5 See Esaquito P. Manalo, The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group, Naval 
Post Graduate School 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429991&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2009). 
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Manila,6  and since 2000, terrorist acts in the Philippines have killed or 
injured more than 1,700 people.7  The attacks included bombings of “buses 
carrying workers, food markets where people were shopping, airports where 
relatives were waiting for loved ones, and ferry boats carrying families.”8  
The Philippine government responded to the growing terrorist problem with 
military force.  No law, however, identified the acts that incurred terrorist 
liability, nor specified the manner in which the acts were punishable.9  The 
Philippine government’s fight against terrorists without an anti-terror law led 
to many complaints of human rights abuses.10   
 
After the United Nations (“U.N.”) substantiated complaints of human 
rights abuses, 11  the Philippine legislature attempted an about-face by 
enacting the Human Security Act of 2007 (“HSA”). 12   The HSA made 
specific acts punishable as acts of terrorism and gave courts the authority to 
determine when a suspect’s actions qualified as acts of terrorism.13  Shortly 
after the HSA’s passage, five prominent advocacy groups petitioned the 
                                                 
6 SUPAPO, supra note 3, at 2. 
7 Philippines: Extremist Groups Target Civilians, More Than 1,700 Killed and Injured in Bombings 
and Kidnappings, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 29, 2007, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/29/philippines-extremist-groups-target-civilians (last visited Oct. 8, 
2009). 
8 Carlos H. Conde, 400 Killed by Terrorism in Philippines since 2000, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/asia/30iht-phils.4.6902202.html.  
9 See Manalo, supra note 5, at 12-13, 23-24.  
10 See Aileen Estoquia, Critics Warn President vs Rushing Anti-Terror Bill, BULATLAT, May 15, 
2005, available at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-14/5-14-atb.htm; see also Cher S. Jimenez, Deadly 
Dirty Work in the Philippines, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IB13Ae01.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (explaining that 
“[p]olitical killings in the Philippines have escalated into a full-blown international issue.”). 
11 U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 30-33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, 37 
(April 16, 2008) (prepared by Philip Alston) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council on the Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights]. 
12 Official Website of the Office of the Solicitor General – Republic of the Philippines, OSG Defends 
Human Security Act, http://www.osg.gov.ph/default.asp?id=40&ACT=5&content=87&mnu=40 (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
13 KENNETH PEREIRE, INT'L CTR. FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH, ANALYSIS 
AND REVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINES HUMAN SECURITY ACT 2007 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Legislative%20Response/revisedPhilippines%20CT%20LAW2007newi.pdf; see 
also Annie Rose A. Laborte, Supreme Court Justice Speaks on the Anti-Terrorism Law, SUP. CT. OF THE 
PHIL. COURT NEWS FLASH, (May 9, 2007), available at 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2007/05/05090702.php (Supreme Court Justice 
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez explaining that the HSA requires the Court to ponder: “[t]o whom and to 
what acts is the law directed” and whether “the law is a potent tool to fight terrorism or to curtail 
fundamental freedom.”). 
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Philippine Supreme Court to strike down the law.14  These groups argue that 
the Philippine Supreme Court should nullify the HSA because it is 
unconstitutionally vague and violative of individual rights.15  The Philippine 
Supreme Court has yet to rule on these cases. 
This comment analyzes the constitutionality of the HSA.  Part II 
provides a historical background of terrorism in the Philippines and observes 
the Philippine government’s responses that led to the passage of the HSA.  
Part III examines whether the HSA is unconstitutionally vague in its 
definition of a punishable terrorist act, and Part IV explores whether the 
HSA impermissibly infringes on individual rights.  Last, Part V examines 
policy considerations. 
II. THE HSA IS THE PHILIPPINES’ SOLUTION TO STOPPING TERRORISM 
WHILE CURBING GOVERNMENTAL ABUSE OF POWER   
For years, the Philippine government used its military to quell 
revolutionary factions. 16   As terrorist networks grew and became 
increasingly problematic, the Philippine government used its military to 
fight concurrently against secessionists and terrorists.17  This response led to 
the U.N. taking action and the Philippine government passing the HSA, a 
law that distinguished between acts of secession and acts of terrorism. 
A. Muslim Secessionism in Mindanao Set the Stage for the Incursion of 
International Terrorists 
Violent struggle for secession in the Philippines provided fertile 
ground for the embedment of international terrorists.  At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the U.S. took control of the Philippines and occupied it 
under the Treaty of Paris.18  After establishing sovereignty,19 the U.S. pushed 
for a policy that encouraged Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas, the 
northern and central regions of the Philippines, to colonize the agricultural 
                                                 
14 Gemma Bagayaua, 5 Petitions Ask Court to Nullify Anti-Terror Law, NEWS BREAK, Sept. 10, 
2007, available at 
http://www.newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3696&Itemid=88889005. 
15 Id. 
16 Reuters AlertNet, Long-Running Muslim and Communist Insurgencies, REUTERS ALERT NET, Apr. 
12, 2008, available at http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/PH_SEP.htm?v=in_detail. 
17 See Manalo, supra note 5, at 12-13, 23-24, 28-30.  
18 Ricardo A. David Jr., The Causes and Prospect of the Southern Philippines Secessionist 
Movement 3 (Dec. 2003) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/David03.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
19 Id. at 40-42. 
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lands in Mindanao, the predominately Muslim southern region of the 
Philippines.20   
This land settlement policy has caused conflict since 1898.21  The 
policy diluted the existing aboriginal people’s land ownership. 22   The 
original Mindanaons, known as the Moros, resented the land settlement 
policy23 and since 1898, have fought for independence.24  By the late 1960s, 
the Moros began to form militias to fight the northern Christian settlers.25  
This conflict, still ongoing, has cost approximately 160,000 lives.26 
As the Moros and other Filipino Muslims fought for rights of self-
determination in Mindanao, 27  the political structure deteriorated, which 
permitted incursion of international terrorists.28  Using military force to fight 
the rebelling Muslim militias,29the Philippine government’s use of tactical 
offensives displaced over two million persons.30  These military offensives 
catalyzed a growth of socio-economic and political grievances that led to an 
unstable social climate. 31   This instability, coupled with “weak political 
institutions, decentralized politics, poor resources, and . . . endemic 
corruption [in the government],”32 made Mindanao an ideal environment for 
the settlement of international terrorists.33  Terrorist groups, such as Al-
Qa’ida, 34  flocked to the aid of the suppressed insurgent militias and 
established the Mindanao region as an operation base.35   
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 40-42. 
23 Id. at 66. 
24 See David, supra note 18, at 40-42. 
25 Id. at 59-60. 
26 See Reuters AlertNet, supra note 16. 
27 See David, supra note 18, at 41-42, 49-50. 
28 See Reuters AlertNet, supra note 16. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See SUPAPO, supra note 3, at 5. 
32 See Manalo, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
33 Id. 
34 Al-Qa’ida is an “international terrorist network” that was “[e]stablished around 1988 by bin 
Laden.”  Al-Qa’ida’s “current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working 
with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ and expelling Westerners 
and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.”  Global Security, Al-Qaeda (2006), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).   
35 See Preeti Bhattacharji, Terrorism Havens: Philippines, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2008), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/ (explaining that the U.S. State Department considers the 
southern Philippines a “terrorist safe haven,” and Al-Qa’ida operates in the Philippines through a handful 
of regional and local organizations); see also Zachary Abuza, Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu 
Sayyaf, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (2005), available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/print.cfm?q=625 (explaining the Mindanao region is a 
base for terrorist operations). 
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B. The Philippine Government’s Use of Military Force to Fight Terrorism 
Made the HSA a Necessity 
The Philippine government’s use of broad military force to fight its 
terrorist problem eventually led to U.N. action and the Philippine’s adoption 
of the HSA.  In 2006, the Philippine government scheduled thirty-seven joint 
exercises with the U.S. military to fight terrorism. 36   These exercises 
included Balikatan—a bilateral military operation precisely aimed at rooting 
out international terrorists. 37   The military offensives produced some 
victories that slowed the growing terrorist footprint,38  but the Philippine 
government’s application of military force without an anti-terror law 
permitted abuses of power.39 
These abuses spurred many complaints of human rights violations.40  
Until the passage of the HSA, military commanders had unilateral authority 
to determine which persons to target as terrorists.41  Human rights groups 
contend military commanders abused their discretion and estimate during 
President Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration42 “at least 830 people [were] 
killed in an extrajudicial fashion, including 365 mostly left-leaning political 
and social activists, . . . journalists, judges, and lawyers known to be 
sympathetic to leftist causes.”43  These extrajudicial killings were not all 
caused exclusively by the Philippine government’s fight against terrorism, 
but they were “committed by death squads . . . [that] operate[d] under the 
protective umbrella of regional [Mindanao] military commands” aimed at 
stopping terrorism.44   
A commission led by former Philippine Supreme Court Justice Jose 
Melo confirmed that members of the military were responsible for the 
“majority” of the extrajudicial killings. 45   A formal U.N. investigation 
                                                 
36 See Bhattacharji, supra note 35. 
37 Id.  
38 See CIA World Fact Book, Philippines (2008), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html. 
39 See Jimenez, supra note 10. 
40 See Bhattacharji, supra note 35.  
41 Mouloud Boumghar, Frédéric Ceuppens & Nabeel Rajab, INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION: 
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, FIGHTING TERROR OR TERRORIZING? 9-10 (International 
Federation for Human Rights Apr. 2008), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ph493a.pdf. 
42 President Macapagal-Arroyo “was sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines on January 20, 
2001.”  AsianInfo.org, Confusion and Hope, Politics in the Philippines (2008), 
http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/issues/gloria_macapagal.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
43 See Jimenez, supra note 10. 
44 James Petras and Robin Eastman-Abaya, Philippines: The Killing Fields of Asia (2006), 
http://petras.lahaine.org/articulo.php?c=1&more=1&p=1660 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
45 See Jimenez, supra note 10. 
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subsequently affirmed the Melo Commission’s findings,46 and as a result, the 
U.N. placed the Philippine government on its human rights watch list.47  The 
Philippine government then enacted the HSA to protect its people’s “basic 
rights and fundamental liberties” while continuing its fight against 
terrorism.48  The HSA codified the specific acts punishable as crimes of 
terrorism, delegated authority to the courts to determine when acts qualified 
as being punishable, and made other certain acts also punishable as abuses of 
governmental power.49 
C. Advocacy Groups Petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to Strike 
the HSA for Being Unconstitutionally Vague 
Dubious of the law and deeply afraid of the far-reaching and 
unfettered power of the government as experienced by the alleged officially 
sanctioned extrajudicial killings, five prominent advocacy groups 50 
petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to strike the HSA.51  Under writs of 
certiorari for prohibition and mandamus,52 these advocacy groups argue the 
                                                 
46 See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 11. 
47 Nikko Dizon, PNP: Extrajudicial killings fell by 83% in 2007, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 
14, 2008, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080114-112184/PNP-Extrajudicial-
killings-fell-by-83-in-2007 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
48 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.), available at http://www.ops.gov.ph/records/ra_no9372.htm. 
49 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., THE MAKING OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 39 (2007). 
50 The five prominent advocacy groups were:  (1) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or New Patriotic 
Alliance, “a nationwide alliance of people’s organizations with members from the ranks of workers, 
farmers, youth, women, urban poor, indigenous peoples, church people, [and] human rights defenders” 
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bayan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 6 (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_petition.pdf); (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114
); (3) the Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc., which works toward the “constructive 
engagement of rebel groups in peace processes, human rights, international humanitarian law, and other 
areas of human security” (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. v. 
Anti-Terrorism Council, 4 (2007), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_SC_Petition.pdf); (4) Kilusang 
Mayo Uno, which “operates as a labor center espousing genuine, militant, and nationalist trade unionism” 
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, 3 (July 2007), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111
); and (5) KARAPATAN, an independent human rights organization involved in documenting and 
providing legal support to victims of human rights abuses (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Karapatan v. 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 9 & 13 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=showdown&id=11
3). 
51 See Bagayaua, supra note 14. 
52 Philippine Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the writ of certiorari for prohibition and mandamus, 
authorizes the Philippine Supreme Court to nullify the HSA based on a grave abuse of discretion by 
Philippine lawmakers.  See R. Civ. P. 65, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (1997) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.chanrobles.com/specialcivilactions.htm#RULE%2065. 
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HSA is a legitimization for the Philippine government to continue violating 
constitutionally protected individual rights.53  The Philippine Supreme Court 
has not accepted any of these cases.54  The Court’s refusal to rule on the 
HSA permitted the anti-terror law to gain notoriety as “one of the 
[Philippines’] most controversial laws passed in this decade—if not in this 
century.”55   
 
III. THE HSA’S DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VIABLE   
 
At the heart of the five petitions before the Philippine Supreme Court 
is criticism that the HSA contains an overly vague definition of terrorism.56  
The HSA defines a terrorist act by listing a set of specific acts incorporated 
from other statutes and presidential decrees, and requires that these acts 
create “a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among 
the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful 
demand.” 57   Some of the acts listed are piracy, coup d’état, murder, 
kidnapping, arson, hijacking, and the unlawful possession of a firearm.58  
The petitioners characterize this definition as overly vague and made so with 
intent to permit continued arbitrary punishment of “legitimate expressions of 
political dissent and social protest.”59  This section analyzes whether the 
HSA’s definition of a punishable act of terrorism is unconstitutionally vague. 
A vagueness challenge to a statute proceeds in one of two ways:  1) a 
court can examine whether the statute is vague on its face; or 2) a court can 
examine the statute as it is applied in a particular case that involves a 
specific set of facts. 60   The Philippine Constitution also incorporates 
international law into Philippine domestic law,61 so the Philippine Supreme 
Court may also analyze the HSA against international norms.  This section 
examines the HSA’s definition under all three possible analyses:  Part A 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Tetch Torres, Supreme Court Asked to Declare Anti-Terror Law Unconstitutional, INQUIRER.NET, 
Sept. 19, 2007, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=89449 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
55 Alexander Remollino, Juan Ponce Enrile: Martial Law Architect, HSA Sponsor, WORLD PROUT 
ASSEMBLY (July 24, 2007), http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2007/07/juan_ponce_enri.html 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).  
56 See Bagayaua, supra note 14. 
57 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.). 
58 Id. 
59 BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT: RECIPE FOR UNDECLARED 
MARTIAL LAW 3 (2007), available at http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/primerHSA.pdf. 
60 RUFUS RODRIGUEZ, THE CRIME OF PLUNDER IN THE PHILIPPINES 363 (2002). 
61 CONST. (1987), Art. III § 2 (Phil), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupremelaw2.html. 
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examines whether the definition is facially unconstitutional; Part B explores 
an applied challenge; and Part C determines whether the HSA’s definition 
violates international law. 
A. The HSA’s Vagueness Does Not Render It Facially Unconstitutional  
The five petitions before the Philippine Supreme Court disputing the 
HSA’s vagueness are all facial challenges.  As facial challenges, the 
petitioners lack factual cases where a trier of fact may determine whether the 
law provided adequate notice to a suspected violator of the prohibited 
action.62  The petitioners accordingly argue the HSA is unconstitutional in 
every application. 63   Four of the five complaints contend the HSA’s 
definition of terrorism is unlawfully vague and petition the Philippine 
Supreme Court to strike the HSA using the void-for-vagueness doctrine.64  
Subpart 1 explains why the Philippine Supreme Court will most likely not 
apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine; Subpart 2 explains why the HSA 
passes the void-for-vagueness test even if the Court applies the void-for-
vagueness doctrine; and Subpart 3 examines why the Court would uphold 
the HSA despite some vagueness in the law’s definition of terrorism.   
1. The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine Is Inapplicable to the HSA 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is limited in its scope of application.  
The doctrine provides “that what makes a statute susceptible to [void-for-
vagueness] is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application.”65  The petitioners argue the Philippine Supreme 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition at 7, Southern Hemisphere Engagement 
Network Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552 (July 16, 2007). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_SC_Petition.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64  Accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Bayan  v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,  (July 
16, 2007). (Phil.), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_petition.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
Prohibition, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, (July 2007). (Phil), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Karapatan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (Aug. 6, 2007). 
(Phil) available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=showdown&id=11
3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, (Aug. 2007). (Phil), 
available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114. 
65  Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693,  
20 SCRA 849. (July 31, 1967). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1967/jul1967/gr_l-24693_1967.php (Connally v. 
General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
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Court should apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine to strike the HSA for 
two reasons.  First, the petitioners argue the doctrine applies because the 
HSA restricts freedom of speech. 66   The second argument lobbies the 
Philippine Supreme Court to expand the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s 
application to criminal statutes because it is the best test to determine 
statutory unconstitutional vagueness.67 
The petitioners find support in Philippine Supreme Court’s dissents.68  
In the 2001 case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Justice Kapunan argued in a 
dissent that a vagueness challenge to a penal statute should be allowed 
because an unconstitutionally vague penal statute involves a “deprivation of 
liberty, and even life, which inarguably, are rights as important as, if not 
more than, free speech.”69  In the 2004 case of Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 
Justice Tinga, also in a dissent, noted “‘the void-for-vagueness doctrine’ 
must not only apply to free-speech cases but also, if not with greater force, 
to penal statutes.”70   These dissents, however, are overshadowed by the 
majority opinions. 
The likelihood is that the Philippine Supreme Court will follow its 
precedent and not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  The Court’s case 
law currently restricts the void-for-vagueness doctrine to free-speech cases, 
and the HSA is not speech limiting legislation.  The Philippine Supreme 
Court’s most recent address of whether the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
applies to penal statutes was in the 2008 case of Carlos Romualdez and 
Erlinda Romualdez, v. Commission on Elections and Dennis Garay.  Here, 
the Philippine Supreme Court refused to apply the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine to criminal statutes, reasoning that an overextension of the doctrine 
“would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even 
reached the courts.”71   The Court explained, “[s]uch invalidation would 
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of ‘actual case and 
controversy’ and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context 
                                                 
66 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, 15 (Aug.  
2007). (Phil.), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114. 
67 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Eduardo Ermita, 30-31 
(July 2007). (Phil.), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=111. 
68 Id. 
69 Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560 (S.C., Nov. 19, 2001). (Phil.) (Kapunan, J., 
dissenting), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/148560.htm. 
70 Alfredo Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259 (S.C., July 29, 2004). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/gr_152259_2004.html. 
71 Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez, v. Comm’n on Elections and Dennis Garay, G.R. No. 
167011 (S.C., Dec. 11, 2008). (Phil), available at 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/167011.htm. 
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having no factual concreteness.”72  Thus, unless the Court diverges from its 
precedent, it will not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the HSA.    
2. The HSA Would Pass the Test Set Out Under the Void-For-Vagueness 
Doctrine 
Assuming the Philippine Supreme Court applies the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, the HSA is nevertheless within constitutional limits.  
The void-for-vagueness doctrine makes the HSA unconstitutional only if it is 
vague “in all its possible applications.” 73   In the 2004 case of Alfredo 
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, the Philippine Supreme Court explained that 
an unconstitutionally vague law “lacks comprehensible standards that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in 
its application.”74  Four years later, in Romulo Neri v. Senate Committee on 
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Philippine Supreme 
Court provided that a law is void for vagueness when it fails to give “fair 
notice of the conduct to avoid, and it leaves law enforcers unbridled 
discretion in carrying out [the law’s] provisions.”75  The HSA does not meet 
these criteria. 
Contrary to the petitioners’ arguments, the HSA passes the void-for-
vagueness test because it is not vague “in all its possible applications.”76  
The HSA defines an act of terrorism by enumerating a finite list of criminal 
acts that are already punishable in the Revised Penal Code, Presidential 
Decrees, or Republic Acts, and requires that the action create “a condition of 
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to 
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.”77  This definition 
permits a court to punish a violator so long as the violative act (actus reus) is 
one of the HSA’s enumerated punishable acts, the violator possessed the 
specific intent (mens rea) “to coerce the government to give in to an 
unlawful demand,” and there existed the attendant circumstances of 
                                                 
72 Id.  
73 Randolf David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (S.C., Mar. 3, 2006). (Phil.), 
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm. 
74 Alfredo Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259 (S.C., July 29, 2004). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/gr_152259_2004.html. 
75 Romulo Neri v. Senate Comm. on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 
180643 (S.C., Sept. 4, 2008). (Phil), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_180643_lq_2008.html. 
76 Randolf David v. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (S.C., May 3, 2006). (Phil.), 
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm. 
77 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act of 
2007”), Rep. Act 9372, § 3 (Mar. 9, 2007) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.ops.gov.ph/records/ra_no9372.htmHuman Security Act, Rep. Act 9372 § 3. 
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“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace.”78  While 
not drawing a bright line that distinctly demarks which acts are punishable, 
the HSA requires the judiciary to determine when the requisite intent and 
attendant circumstances exist to make the violative act a punishable act of 
terrorism.  This requirement dispels the petitioners’ challenged vagueness. 
Using the plain meaning rule to interpret the HSA’s definition of a 
punishable terrorist act,79 the words’ meanings do not seem confusing to 
“men of common intelligence” in all possible applications.80  An ordinary 
reading suggests the HSA forbids certain acts aimed at creating “a state of 
danger, panic, fear, or chaos to the general public or segment thereof [done 
to coerce or intimidate] the government to do or refrain from doing an act.”81  
While individual terms within the HSA’s definition are subject to 
interpretation—narrow or broad—the entire definition, when read as a 
whole, manifests comprehensible notice to an ordinary reader.  The 
cumulative effect therefore does not deprive an ordinary reader of fair notice 
in every possible application.  While the HSA is not void-for-vagueness 
because the terms are sufficiently defined, the Court may also examine the 
HSA to determine whether the HSA is so vague that the law cannot 
accomplish its purpose. 
3. The Prospect of Abuse Does Not Warrant Invalidation 
Apart from the void-for-vagueness test, the Philippine Supreme Court 
may also analyze whether the HSA’s definition of terrorism is so vague that 
it impedes the law’s purpose.  The HSA also passes this inquiry.  In the 2006 
case of Randolf David v. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Philippine 
Supreme Court held “[t]he validity of a statute or ordinance is to be 
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end 
desired.”82  The Court concluded “courts are not at liberty to declare statutes 
invalid although they may be abused in the manner of application.”83  The 
HSA makes clear that its purpose is to “protect life, liberty, and property 
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79 Republic of the Philippines v. Carlito Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 (S.C., Mar. 2, 2007). (Phil.), 
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/158253.htm. (characterizing the plain 
meaning rule in statutory interpretation as: “if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be 
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation”). 
80 Carlos Romualdez, v. Comm’n on Elections and Dennis Garay, G.R. No. 167011 (S.C., Dec. 11, 
2008). (Phil.), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/december2008/167011.htm. 
81 See PEREIRE, supra note 13, at 1. 
82 Randolf David v. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (S.C. May 3, 2006). (Phil.), 
available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm. 
83 Id. 
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from acts of terrorism.”84  The HSA’s definition of terrorism accomplishes 
this purpose because it provides notice that courts can punish specific acts as 
crimes of terrorism if the violator possessed the necessary criminal intent, 
and the required attendant circumstances existed.  Therefore, despite 
allegations that the Philippine government may be apt to abuse the HSA,85 
such propensity does not warrant invalidation.  While the HSA is likely 
constitutional on its face, it may be challenged as unconstitutional when 
applied to a specific set of facts.  The following section explores an as-
applied challenge. 
B. In an As-Applied Challenge, the HSA May Be Unconstitutionally 
Vague If Wrongly Applied  
Absent a factual case in which the Philippine Supreme Court may 
determine the lawfulness of the HSA’s application, a case study is used here 
to test an as-applied challenge.  This examination shows that the lawfulness 
of an as-applied challenge to the HSA is dependent on the facts of the 
situation.  The test case is a recent Philippine criminal case. 
The case of Edgar de la Cruz Candule began on March 21, 2008.86  
Police arrested Candule for illegal possession of a firearm. 87   Candule 
alleges police tortured him during his arrest and incarceration, which caused 
him to admit he owned the pistol seized and was a member of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (“CPP-NPA”).88  
On April 1, 2008, the prosecuting attorney amended Candule’s charge to 
include a violation of the HSA.89  The prosecutor charged Candule with 
violating the HSA for:  
[O]penly professing himself as a member of the New 
People’s Army (NPA) and advocating the overthrow of the 
                                                 
84 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 2 (2007) (Phil). 
85 NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, OUTLINE OF CRITIQUE OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW KNOWN AS THE 
HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 1 (2007), available at http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/CODAL%20 
critique%20of%20the%20Anti-terrorism%20Law.pdf. 
 
86 Aeta Recounts Nightmarish Encounter with the Philippines’s Anti-Terrorism Law, PINOY PRESS, 
Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.pinoypress.net/2008/10/09/an-aetas-nightmarish-encounter-with-philippiness-
terrorism-law/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army is an internationally recognized 
terrorist organization.  NORIYUKI GATAGIRI, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, IN THE SPOTLIGHT: THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP) (2002), http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/cpp.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2009). 
89 See Aeta Recounts Nightmarish Encounter with the Philippines’s Anti-Terrorism Law, supra note 
86.  
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legitimate government by force of arms using unlicensed 
firearms and ammunitions and by inciting others to commit acts 
of rebellion thereby sowing and creating a condition of 
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the 
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to their 
demands.90 
Applying the HSA’s definition of terrorism to Candule’s case, the 
HSA makes clear which acts it prohibits.  It is well established in the 
“Philippines [that] no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute.”91  The 
Philippine Supreme Court has required specificity in criminal statutes but 
has also given wide latitude to the Philippine Congress.   
In adjudicating vagueness challenges, the Philippine Supreme Court 
has required a high threshold of unconstitutional vagueness for it to strike 
down a law.  In the en banc case of In re:  Arsenio Gonzales v. Comm’n on 
Elections, the Philippine Supreme Court held that a criminal law may be 
struck if it “suffers from [a] fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness.”92  
Arsenio Gonzales shows the vagueness threshold to be a high bar; the 
Philippine Supreme Court determined that the law challenged was vague, 
but the Court nevertheless upheld the law because other Filipino laws 
defined the vague terms.93  Also, in the 2000 case of Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, 
the Philippine Supreme Court reinforced its Dans v. People holding that a 
penal statute is constitutional as long as it answers “the basic query [of] 
‘[w]hat is the violation.’”94  The Court in Sajul provided, “[a]nything beyond 
this, the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys,’ are evidentiary matters, which the law 
cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case.”95 
Applying the law to the HSA as applied in Candule’s situation, the 
Philippine Supreme Court would have to determine whether the HSA 
punishes the actions of owning a firearm and associating with the CPP-NPA.  
The HSA is clear on this point.  The HSA does punish unlawful possession 
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91 Norma Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, (S.C. July 11, 1994). 
(Phil.) (citing United States v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725, 728 (1916)), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_111426_1994.html. 
92 In re: Arsenio Gonzales v. Comm’n on Elections, G.R. No. L-27833 (S.C. Apr. 18, 1969). (Phil.), 
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/apr1969/gr_l-27833_1969.html.  
93 Id.  
94 See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 243 (citing Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135294 (S.C. 
Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)).  
95 Id.  
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of a firearm, but only when the act accompanies the required attendant 
circumstances, and the perpetrator possessed the required specific intent.96 
The HSA does not prohibit owning a firearm or associating with the 
CPP-NPA.  The evidence does not clearly support the charge that Candule 
used the pistol to create “a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear 
and panic among the populace.”97  Any vagueness contained in differing 
interpretations of the HSA’s wording, “widespread and extraordinary fear 
and panic among the populace,”98 seem evidentiary—a matter of the “hows” 
and “whys” rather than the “whats.”99   
Additionally, there is no evidence that Candule possessed the required 
specific criminal intent.  Candule’s membership in the CPP-NPA does not 
suffice to prove that while possessing the firearm he intended “to coerce the 
government to give in to an unlawful demand.”100  The “basic query [of] 
‘[w]hat is the violation’” 101 is therefore clear:  the HSA is not prohibitive of 
Candule’s actions because his possession of the firearm did not accompany 
the requisite attendant circumstances.  Other permeations of the facts, 
however, may substantiate that Candule did possess the required specific 
intent.  Therefore, the constitutionality of the HSA in an as-applied challenge 
hinges on the facts of the case.  Nevertheless, indicia of definitional 
vagueness in the HSA do not frustrate the law’s purpose.  Because Philippine 
domestic law incorporates international law, the following section analyzes 
the HSA’s definitional vagueness against international standards. 
 
C. The HSA’s Definitional Vagueness Does Not Unconstitutionally 
Violate International Law   
 
The Philippine Supreme Court may also conduct an analysis of the 
HSA in light of international law as integrated by the Philippine 
Constitution.102  Article II of the Constitution states the Philippines “adopts 
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of 
                                                 
96 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.) (referencing in part Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree 
Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or 
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 243 (citing Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135294 (S.C. 
Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)).   
100 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.). 
101 See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 243 (citing Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135294 (S.C. 
Nov. 20, 2000). (Phil.)). 
102 CONST. (1987), Art. II § 2, (Phil), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/article2.htm.  
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the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, 
cooperation, and amity with all nations.”103  In the 1949 Philippine Supreme 
Court case of Kuroda v. Jalandoni, Chief Justice Moran interpreted Article II 
to incorporate into Philippine law the Hague Convention, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the “significant precedents of international 
jurisprudence.” 104   The analysis here examines the international legal 
disagreement on the definition of terrorism, evaluates the HSA with regard 
to the most widely accepted international conventions, and finds that the 
HSA comports.  
International law lacks a consensual definition of which acts 
comprehensively constitute acts of terrorism. 105   The fundamental 
impediment to defining terrorism is a general disagreement on whether acts 
related to rebellions or insurgencies are acts of terrorism.106  This impasse is 
apparent in the October 2008 report of the Chairman of the Working Group 
on Terrorism and in the March 2008 conclusion of the U.N. General 
Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism.107  Both groups concluded without agreement.108  The definitional 
disagreement on whether acts of terrorism include acts related to rebellions 
or insurgencies manifests principally between the Arab and the Western 
world’s uncompromising positions.  The Arab Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism believes the 
definition of terrorism does not include acts related to struggles for liberation 
and self-determination. 109   Contrarily, Western countries oppose absolute 
exclusion and believe acts of terrorism should encompass greater 
inclusivity.110   
                                                 
103 CONST. (1987), Art. II § 2, (Phil), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/article2.htm. 
104 Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, (S.C. Mar. 26, 1949). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/mar1949/gr_l-2662_1949.html. 
105 ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, JR., NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM, APPLYING THE LAW OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 50 (2007). 
106 There Is No U.N. Definition of Terrorism, STRAIGHT U.N. FACTS (Eye on the UN/Project of the 
Hudson Institute New York and the Touro College Institute for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), 2005,  




110 Tarjuman Ul Quran, Islam and the West: Who is the Terrorist? (Khuram Murad trans., 1995), THE 
MODERN RELIGION, http://www.themodernreligion.com/terror/terrorism_who.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2009). 
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The USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of terrorism exemplifies a broad 
inclusion of most violent acts.111  Under the USA PATRIOT Act, a domestic 
terrorist is any person who engages within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
U.S. in illegal “acts dangerous to human life” with the purpose to “(i) 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.” 112  Broadly, 
the USA PATRIOT Act includes as acts of terrorism all illegal “acts 
dangerous to human life” performed to influence the U.S. government.113 
Despite the stalemate between the East and the West, the U.N. has 
promulgated some guidance.  A 2004 U.N. report suggested the definition of 
terrorism should include as elements:  the use of force against civilians; the 
use of force to intimidate civilians; or the use of force “to compel a 
[g]overnment or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an 
act.” 114   This report also stated that such a definition should include 
provisions from the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1566.115  The Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit acts or 
threats of violence aimed at spreading terror among a civilian population.116  
The U.N. Security Resolution 1566 explicitly provides that the purpose of a 
terrorist act is “to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group 
of persons or particular persons, [or to] intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing 
any act.”117  Additionally, a 2005 report by the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan also provided guidance.  The Secretary-General’s report “proposed to 
define terrorism as ‘any action . . . intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a 
                                                 
111 See How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” ACLU, Dec. 6, 2002, 
http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14444leg20021206.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
112 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 376, § 802 (codified as amended in section 
18 U.S.C. 2331(5)) (2001) (USA PATRIOT Act).    
113 See How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” supra note 111. 
114 U.N. Gen. Assem. Rep., Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Gen. 
Assem. Rep., Millennium Summit]. 
115 Id. 
116 See Article 13 §2 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts: Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949, [1977], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971bcff1c10c125641e0052b545 
[hereinafter U.N. Non-International Armed Conflicts Protocol, art 13 §2]. 
117  S.C. Res. 1566, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SC1566.pdf. 
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population or compelling a government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing any act.’”118   
The HSA’s definition of a punishable terrorist act complies with these 
guidelines.  The HSA’s required attendant circumstances of “sowing and 
creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among 
the populace” and its mens rea requirement “to coerce the government to 
give in to an unlawful demand”119 conform to the 2004 U.N. report, which 
suggests the definition of terrorism should prohibit the use of force against 
civilians, the use of force to intimidate civilians, or the use of force “to 
compel a [g]overnment . . . to do or abstain from doing an act.”120  The 
HSA’s definition also conforms with the Geneva Conventions because the 
law prohibits acts or threats of violence aimed at spreading terror among the 
Philippine population;121 comports with the U.N. Security Resolution 1566 
because the law prohibits coercion of the Philippine government;122 and is 
congruent with the Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2005 proposed 
definition.123  Therefore, the HSA’s definition of a terrorist act satisfies the 
widely accepted provisions of international law.  The following section 
examines the HSA’s substantive measures. 
 
IV. THE HSA SURVIVES SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES 
 
The second most prominent complaint against the HSA is it 
unconstitutionally infringes on individual rights.124  This section explores the 
constitutionality of the HSA’s detention and search and seizure provisions.  
The petitioners argue the authority granted to law enforcers in the HSA to 
detain suspected terrorists, limit confined individuals’ access to cell phones 
and email, and to search and seize suspected terrorists’ communications and 
                                                 
118 Claire Applegarth, UN Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Convention; Treaty Seven Years in the Making, 
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, May 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Nuclear 
TerrorismConvention (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).  
119 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 3 (2007) (Phil.). 
120 See U.N. Gen. Assem. Rep., Millennium Summit, supra note 114. 
121 See U.N. Non-International Armed Conflicts Protocol, art 13 §2, supra note 116. 
122 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 117. 
123 See Applegarth, supra note 118.  
124 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bayan v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (July 17, 2007). (Phil.), 
available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Phil_petition.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kilusang Mayo Uno 
v. Eduardo Ermita, (July 2007). (Phil.), available at 
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financial property unjustly abridges constitutional liberties.  Part A analyzes 
the HSA against the Philippine jurisprudence’s three-part test of due process.  
Part B then examines the legality of the HSA’s measures in light of 
international law as interpreted by the Philippine Supreme Court.      
 
A. For an Invasive Statute to Be Constitutional, It Must Pass the Due 
Process Three-Prong Test 
 
The chief complaint is the HSA violates the constitutional right of due 
process.125  The due process clause of the Philippine Constitution protects 
against governmental deprivation of “life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”126  A noted authority on Philippine constitutional law, J. 
Isagani Cruz, wrote, “[d]ue process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness 
[from] the government . . . [and] the law [that] unreasonably deprives a 
person of his life, liberty, or his property.”127  To determine whether a law 
unconstitutionally curtails due process, the Philippine Supreme Court 
adopted a three-part test:  1) the problem the law cures must affect the 
“interests of the public generally”; 2) “the means adopted must be 
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the [law’s] purpose and not 
unduly oppressive”; and 3) “[a] reasonable relation must exist between the 
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for [the law’s] 
accomplishment.”128 
 
1. As Terrorism Afflicts All Filipinos, the HSA Affects the Interests of the 
General Public 
 
In punishing acts of terrorism, the HSA succeeds in the first prong of 
the due process test:  the problem addressed affects the general interests of 
the public.  Terrorism is a malignancy that afflicts the Filipino society as a 
whole.129   Terrorist attacks are not symptomatic of private interests, but 
comprise an indiscriminate plague that has included murder in Filipino 
markets, on public-transportation, and in other public meeting places. 130  
                                                 
125 See COLMENARES, supra note 85, at 4. 




128 City of Manila v. Perfecto Laguio, Jr, G.R. No. 118127, (S.C. Apr. 12, 2005). (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/apr2005/gr_118127_2005.html. 
129 See Conde, supra note 8. 
130 Id. 
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Reinforcing this conclusion, section two of the HSA provides that terrorism 
is “a crime against [all] the Filipino people.”131  Thus, because the HSA is a 
law passed to curb a societal ill, it passes the first criterion of the due process 
test. 
 
2. The HSA’s Preventative Detention, House Arrest, and Search and 
Seizure Measures Are Reasonably Necessary and Not Overly 
Oppressive   
 
The HSA also passes the second part of the due process test:  its 
means are reasonably necessary and not overly oppressive.  The petitioners 
find fault with the HSA’s provisions that authorize preventative detention; 
house arrest; and search and seizure.  Subpart a) analyzes whether the HSA’s 
preventative detention provisions are reasonably necessary and not overly 
oppressive; Subpart b) examines the HSA’s house arrest provisions; Subpart 
c) tests the HSA’s search and seizure measures; and Subpart d) looks at the 
HSA’s built-in punishments and protections that curb potential abuse.       
a. Preventative Detention 
First, the petitioners contend the HSA’s authorization for law 
enforcers to present a terror suspect to a judge for formal charging three days 
after arrest is unconstitutional.132  To stop a terrorist attack, however, law 
enforcers may have to travel to remote locations on distant islands, and 
transportation delays may slow the delivery of a suspect to judicial 
authorities for formal charging. 133   Because of this reality, the HSA’s 
authorization of a three-day detention before presentment for charging seems 
reasonably necessary. 
The HSA’s delayed presentment does not seem overly oppressive.  
First, the narrowness of codifying an express limit of three days explicitly 
cabins the duration of oppression.  Second, the HSA requires law enforcers 
to present a person suspected of the crime of terrorism to a judge in the 
jurisdiction where the arrest occurred before subjecting that person to 
                                                 
131 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 2 (2007) (Phil.). 
132 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, 39-40 
(Aug. 2007). (Phil.), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114. 
133 “The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands. It stretches from the south of China to the 
northern tip of Borneo.”  Government of the Philippines, Philippines: General Information (2007), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071022221129/http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/general.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009). 
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custodial confinement.134  Third, the HSA explicitly requires that this judge 
determine whether the law enforcers misused their power and whether 
national security concerns merit custodial confinement.135  Cumulatively, 
these conditions keep the harshness of the HSA’s detention measure within 
reasonable limits. 
b. House Arrest 
Second, the petitioners argue the HSA’s authorization for house arrest 
and restricted communication, despite little evidence of guilt, is 
unconstitutional.136  After a prosecutor formally charges a suspect with the 
crime of terrorism, the HSA permits a court to confine the defendant to 
house arrest and to restrict his or her access to electronic communications.137  
Because many will die if a terrorist attack is successful and the recipients of 
electronic communications are difficult to vet, confining an accused to his or 
her home without access to electronic communications while the case is 
pending seems reasonably necessary to stop a suspected attack.  The 
existence of strong or weak evidence does not detract from the criticality of 
this measure.   
The narrowness of the HSA’s authorization for house arrest with 
restricted communication also limits undue oppression.  While the HSA 
allows for a lower burden of proof to justify the implementation of this 
measure, the anti-terror law requires judicial determination to execute the 
procedure.138  This judicial oversight and required authorization serve to 
limit undue oppression from political bias.  Furthermore, the HSA demands 
that restrictions cease “upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal 
of the case.”139  This durational cap, bounded by standard trial procedures, 
places a firm ceiling on the scope of oppression.  Therefore, the HSA’s 
provisions that authorize house arrest with restricted access to electronic 
communications seem reasonably necessary and not overly oppressive. 
 
 
                                                 
134 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 18 (2007) (Phil.). 
135 Id. 
136 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita, 39-40 
(Aug. 2007). (Phil.), available at 
http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=88889273&func=startdown&id=114. 
137 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 26 (2007) (Phil.). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
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c. Search and Seizure 
Third, the petitioners assert the HSA unconstitutionally permits 
arbitrariness and undue oppression because it authorizes law enforcers to 
conduct wiretaps and to examine or seize an individual’s financial assets.140  
The HSA specifically requires a court of appeals to approve a search and 
seizure of a suspected terrorist’s communications and monetary assets.141  
This process is distinguishable from that in Executive Order 626-A, which 
was found unconstitutional in Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals.142   
Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals involved police confiscation of 
the petitioner’s carabaos143 because the petitioner violated Executive Order 
626-A. 144   Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of carabaos 
between provinces. 145   The Philippine Supreme Court concluded the 
application of the law was overly oppressive because Executive Order 626-A 
allowed for “violation[s] [to] have been pronounced not by the police only 
but by a court of justice.”146  The Court held “[d]ue process [was] violated 
because the owner of the property confiscated [was] denied the right to be 
heard in his defense and [was] immediately condemned and punished.”147    
The HSA is distinguishable from Executive Order 626-A because the 
HSA does not allow police autonomously to condemn a violator.  The HSA 
demands that an appellate court judge determine the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure before police execution.148  Therefore, because the HSA 
relies on the independent and impartial discretion of a senior judicial officer 
to ensure that invasive procedures are not overly oppressive before police 
execution, the HSA, unlike Executive Order 626-A, is within constitutional 
limits. 
 
                                                 
140 DR. GIOVANNI TAPANG, SAMAHAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG AGHAMAT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA 
SAMBAYAN, INTRUDING INTO EVERYONE’S PRIVACY: THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT USHERS IN BIG BROTHER 
(2007), available at http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/Intruding%20into%20Everyone%27s%20 
Privacy%20by%20Dr.%20Tapang.pdf. 
141 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 §§ 8, 27 (2007) (Phil.). 
142 Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, (S.C. Mar. 20, 1987). (Phil.), 
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/mar1987/gr_74457_1987.html. 
143 A carabao is a water buffalo.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 311 (2d ed. 1993).  
144 Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, (S.C. Mar. 20, 1987). (Phil.), 




148 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 §§ 8 & 27 (2007) (Phil.). 
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d. The HSA Intrinsically Protects Against Undue Oppression 
The HSA also provides explicit duties for and punishments on 
government officials, which limit the law from being used in an overly 
oppressive manner.  Before enactment of the HSA, the military was the 
government’s main tool to eradicate terrorism.149  Unlike the military, which 
had few checks on its decision-making outside the chain-of-command, the 
HSA empowers police through a limited grant of power.  Thirty of the HSA’s 
sixty-two provisions limit police discretion, which in turn limits the potential 
for misuse of power and undue oppression. 150   The legislative history 
provides that the rationale supporting the limited grant of power was “to 
discourage [government] accusations . . . [and to] help compel the 
authorities to make certain that . . . [o]nly charges . . . backed [with] solid 
evidence [would] be used as [the] basis for the detention of persons accused 
of terrorism.”151   
The HSA’s specific punishments and protections include, inter alia, a 
monetary sanction “of P500,000 for every day in detention of a person 
falsely accused of terrorism;”152 a ten- to twelve-year imprisonment sentence 
on law enforcers who fail to notify judicial authorities as prescribed;153 and 
protected privileged communications between “lawyers and clients, doctors 
and patients, journalists and their sources, and confidential business 
correspondence.”154  The HSA also created a legal grievance committee to 
receive and evaluate complaints against law enforcers; 155  created a 
congressional oversight committee to review the law one year after its 
implementation;156 and delegated authority to the Commission on Human 
Rights to give the highest priority to investigating and prosecuting civil and 
political rights violations.157  Therefore, while the HSA grants expanded 
authority to law enforcers in the areas of preventative detention, house 
arrest, and search and seizure, the HSA forestalls potential undue oppression 
by explicitly providing significant protections to suspected lawbreakers and 
                                                 
149 See Bhattacharji, supra note 35. 
150 See PIMENTEL, supra note 49, at 39. 
151 Id. at 216. 
152 Press Release, Philippine Information Agency, Gov't to Implement Human Security Act With 
Respect To Civil Liberties, Constitution (July 11, 2007), available at 
http://pia.gov.ph/?m=12&r=NCR&y=07&mo=04&fi=p070711.htm&no=14. 
153 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 18 (2007) (Phil.). 
154 Id. § 7. 
155 Id. § 56. 
156 Id. § 59. 
157  Id. § 55. 
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witnesses from governmental misuse of power.158  The following section 
examines prong three of the due process test. 
 
3. A Reasonable Relation Exists Between the Purposes of the HSA and 
the Means Adopted 
 
The HSA also passes the last prong of the due process test:  The 
HSA’s preventative detention, house arrest, and search and seizure measures 
are reasonably related to the law’s purpose.  Subpart a) analyzes whether the 
HSA’s preventative detention provisions are reasonably related to the 
purpose of stopping terrorism; Subpart b) examines the HSA’s house arrest 
provisions; and Subpart c) looks at the HSA’s search and seizure measures.       
a. Preventative Detention 
First, preventative detention of a terror suspect is not a prima facie 
unconstitutional deprivation of an individual’s right to travel.  The Philippine 
Constitution provides that “the right to travel [shall not] be impaired except 
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” 159  
Stopping a terrorist attack falls under this ambit.  The Revised Penal Code, 
since its inception in 1930, has also authorized preventative detention.160  
With increase in the severity of the crime and punishment, the Revised Penal 
Code has authorized increasing preventative detention times. 161   As a 
terrorist act is a crime of immense severity, the history of preventative 
detention in Revised Penal Code shows a longstanding practice that supports 
the reasonableness of the HSA’s three-day preventative detention.162    
b. House Arrest 
Second, the HSA permits a court to confine a suspected terrorist to 
house arrest without access to electronic communications.163  It is widely 
                                                 
158 See PEREIRE, supra note 13, at 2. 
159 CONST. (1987), Art. III § 6 (Phil), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/article3.htm. 
160 See An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, Act No. 3815, Art. 125 (1930), 
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm (permitting 
preventive suspension for up to twelve hours for crimes punishable by light penalties, eighteen hours for 
crimes punishable by correctional penalties, and thirty-six hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or 
capital penalties). 
161  Id.  
162 See Ricardo R. Blancaflor, Human Security Act, Anti-Terror Council Rebuts FLAG Claims, 
INQUIRER (Manilla), July 27, 2007, available at 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/talkofthetown/view_article.php?article_id=79271.    
163 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 26 (2007) (Phil.). 
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known that electronic communications may be used to trigger the detonation 
of an explosive device.164  In November 2007, four people, including two 
Philippine congressmen, died from a bomb packed with nails that was 
detonated from afar by a cell phone.165  Therefore, limiting a suspected 
terrorist’s ability to detonate a blast seems reasonably related to stopping a 
suspected attack. 
c. Search and Seizure 
Sources of domestic and international law manifest the reasonableness 
of the relation between the HSA’s search and seizure authorizations and 
fighting terrorism.  The HSA permits law enforcers who have court 
authorization to search and seize a suspected terrorist’s financial assets.166  
Other sources of Philippine and international law that permit similar 
invasive measures illustrate that a limited and court authorized intrusion into 
a suspected terrorist’s financial matters is reasonably related to stopping a 
terrorist attack.167  For example, the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Act 
of 2001 (“AMLA”) allows government officials to examine and freeze bank 
deposits to prevent the crime of money laundering, a known source of 
financing for terrorist activities.168  Also, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (“ASEAN”) Regional Forum, which manages collective Southeast 
Asian regional anti-terrorism measures, called upon member countries169 to 
adhere to its Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing.170  This 
ASEAN dictate required member countries to search and seize terrorists’ 
financial assets as a means to effectively fight terrorism.171  Additionally, the 
Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental organization, 
“recognized as the international standard setter for anti-money laundering 
(AML) efforts,” finds that money laundering is fundamentally linked to 
                                                 
164 See Blancaflor, supra note 162. 
165 Nancy Reyes, Philippine Bomb Was IED Detonated By Cell Phone, ALL NEWS, Nov. 14, 2007, 
http://www.bloggernews.net/111690 (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).  
166 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 §§ 27-29 (2007) (Phil.). 
167 See Blancaflor, supra note 162. 
168 Id. 
169 The Philippines is a member of ASEAN.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations homepage for 
the Philippines, http://www.aseansec.org/4746.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).  
170 H. E. Mr. HOR Namhong, Chairman, Ass'n of Southeast Asian Nations, Statement at Tenth 
Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.aseansec.org/14845.htm.   
171 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing 
(July 30, 2002), available at http://www.aseansec.org/12658.htm (requiring the freezing of terrorists’ 
financial assets). 
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funding terrorists.172  Accordingly, it is reasonable that the HSA permits law 
enforcers, after a judge has weighed the intrusion against the suspect’s right 
of privacy and granted authorization, to identify the character of financial 
assets and to seize these assets if they would likely support terrorist 
activities.  
The HSA also authorizes wiretaps.173  The Philippine Republic Act 
Number 4200, also known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (“AWTL”), 
supports the reasonableness of the HSA’s authorization for law enforcers to 
conduct wiretaps on suspected terrorists.174   Since 1965, the AWTL has 
permitted Philippine governmental authorities, when authorized by a court 
order, to wiretap a suspect in order to stop a crime “against national 
security.”175  The longevity of this practice illustrates its reasonable relation 
to stopping a crime against national security.  Likewise, the HSA’s near 
identical authorization is reasonably related to stopping a terrorist attack—a 
crime against national security.  Next, the HSA’s substantive police measures 
are analyzed against the Philippine Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
international law. 
 
B. The Philippine Supreme Court Is Likely to Find the HSA’s Measures 
Lawful Under International Law 
 
Prominent skeptical voices such as Amnesty International and the 
International Commission of Jurists (“ICJ”) voiced concern that the HSA 
may violate the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).176  The ICCPR, a multilateral treaty that the Philippines ratified 
                                                 
172 PAUL ALLEN SCHOTT, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Definitions and Explanations, 
in REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM I-3, 
I-5 (2nd ed. 2006). 
173 An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism (“Human Security Act”), Rep. 
Act 9372 § 7 (2007) (Phil.). 
174 See Blancaflor, supra note 162. 
175 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of 
Communication, and For Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 4200, Rep. Act No. 1965 § 3 (June 19, 1965) 
(Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1965/ra_4200_1965.html. 
176 Letter from Gerald Staberock, Dir. Global Sec. and Rule of Law Programme, to Philippine Letter 
to Philippine Senate from the International Commission of Jurists (Nov. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.bayan.ph/downloads/campaign/campaign%20international/sr_nov6_06_ICJ%20letter%20to%2
0the%20senate.htm; see also Amnesty International, Philippines: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic 
Review, AI Index: ASA 35/006/2007, (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA350062007 (expressing concern for the HSA 
permitting abuse of power). 
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in 1986,177 memorializes the protection of fundamental human rights.178  In a 
letter to the Philippine Senate, the Director of the ICJ’s Global Security and 
Rule of Law Programme posited that the HSA’s surveillance provisions may 
not contain enough safeguards to protect against violation of the ICCPR’s 
Article 17.179  Article 17 protects against arbitrary privacy intrusions by 
providing, “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation.”180  Because Article II of the Philippine Constitution 
states the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of 
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of 
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations,”181 
the Philippine Supreme Court may conduct an analysis of the HSA with 
regard to international law.182  Based on precedential Philippine case law 
related to the ICCPR, the Philippine Supreme Court is likely to find the HSA 
in good standing.  This section first explains the legal construct behind 
analyzing Philippine Supreme Court case law to understand international 
law, then examines two precedential Philippine cases, and finds the HSA 
lawful. 
The theory of international legal pluralism provides the construct to 
examine how the Philippine Supreme Court would most likely analyze the 
HSA against international law.  A pluralist understanding of international law 
helps to explain the phenomenon that various supreme courts may interpret 
the same concept differently. 183   A pluralistic view of international law 
recognizes that just as “the simplest legal regimes are constituted by a 
plurality of decision-making institutions,” 184  the global stage is likewise 
comprised of various countries that interpret legal concepts differently.  The 
pluralist viewpoint requires distinction between the law as applied in a 
sovereign land by the sovereign’s courts and a “single global law that 
                                                 
177 The Philippines is a member of the ICCPR.  See Universal Human Rights Index of United Nations 
Documents, Philippines, http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/hrsearch/search.do?accessType 
=country&regionCountry=country&orderBy=category&countries=128&lang=en (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
178 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(1966), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm. 
179 See Staberock, supra note 176, § 5. 
180 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 178, art. 17. 
181 CONST. (1987), Art. III § 2 (Phil.), available at 
http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupremelaw2.html. 
182 CONST. (1987), Art. VIII § 5(2) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupremelaw2.html. 
183 Jacques Vanderlinden, What Kind of Law Making in a Global World? The Case of Africa, 67 LA. 
L. REV. 1043, 1058 (2007). 
184 Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 
15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 77 (1998). 
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‘embraces the totality of a group of items.’”185  In light of this difference, 
this section analyzes the HSA with regard to the Philippine Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the ICCPR.       
Two Philippine Supreme Court cases suggest the Philippine Supreme 
Court would interpret the ICCPR to support a subordination of individual 
liberties for reasons of national security.186  In both cases, petitioners asked 
the Philippine Supreme Court to strike laws based on alleged transgression 
of international law.  The first case, Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Raul 
Manglapus, involved a law that restricted personal travel.187  The Philippine 
Supreme Court held that while Article 12 of the ICCPR protects the “right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence,” such rights may 
be restricted by laws that “are necessary to protect national security, public 
order, public health or morals . . .” or the separate rights and freedom of 
others.188  The second case, Bayan v. Eduardo Ermita, was a challenge to a 
statute that restricted individuals’ right to assemble. 189   In Ermita, the 
Philippine Supreme Court held the right of peaceful assembly is both 
guaranteed and limited.190  Finding support in Article 19 of the ICCPR, 
which allows a nation state to deny assembly “on grounds of clear and 
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public 
morals or public health,” the Philippine Supreme Court concluded that a law 
limiting the right to assemble for reason of national security was “not a 
violation of the right but a valid restriction of its exercise.”191  Both these 
cases demonstrate that the Philippine Supreme Court concluded the ICCPR 
permits the restriction of protected liberties to ensure the maintenance of 
national security and public order.192 
                                                 
185 See Vanderlinden, supra note 183. 
186 Ferdinand Marcos v. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668 (S.C. Sept. 15, 1989). 
(Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_88211_1989.html; Bayan v. 
Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 169838 (S.C. Apr. 25, 2006). (Phil.), available at 
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187 Marcos v. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668 (S.C. Sept. 15, 1989). (Phil.), 
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Political & Socio-Economic Rights, Address Before the Fifth Conference of Asian Constitutional Court 
Judges (Oct. 10, 2007), at 15, available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/introduction/pdf/03.pdf. 
192 Ferdinand Marcos v. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668 (S.C. Sept. 15, 1989). 
(Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_88211_1989.html; Bayan v. 
Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 169838 (S.C. Apr. 25, 2006). (Phil.), available at 
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Manglapus and Ermita support the argument that a reasonable 
subordination of privacy under the HSA to prevent acts of terrorism is also 
justified by the need to protect national security.  In Manglapus and in 
Ermita, the Philippine Supreme Court restricted individuals’ rights of liberty 
of movement and assembly,193 which are no less important than the right of 
privacy.  However, in Articles 12 and 19, the ICCPR specifically provides 
that movement and assembly may be restricted for reasons of national 
security. 194   Article 17, conversely, protects individuals’ privacy from 
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” from the government, but does not, like 
Articles 12 and 19, provide for the express exception of national security. 195  
The HSA nevertheless complies with Article 17 because the anti-terror law 
requires before-the-fact judicial authorization. 196   The before-the-fact 
judicial authorization in the HSA forestalls arbitrary or unlawful 
interference, while facilitating protection of the Philippine national security.  
Therefore, Manglapus and Ermita illustrate that if the Philippine Supreme 
Court employs its previous analyses, it will interpret the HSA’s restriction on 
individual liberties as in conformance with the letter and spirit of the ICCPR.  
The following section examines policy considerations of the HSA. 
 
V. THE HSA IS GOOD POLICY BECAUSE IT STRENGTHENS DEMOCRATIC 
IDEALS 
 
Most national anti-terror laws have been part of a larger political 
effort to create a broad international response to fighting terrorism.197  In the 
wake of the September 11th attacks in the U.S., the U.N. Security Council 
passed Resolution 1373, which required criminalization of terrorist acts and 
terrorist financing.198  Most countries enacted new laws or modified current 
ones to largely permit political branches of government to determine the 
                                                 
193 Ferdinand Marcos v. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668 (S.C. Sept. 15, 1989). 
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proper balance between individual liberty and collective security.199  The 
HSA did not follow this trend.  Rather, the HSA innovatively required 
Philippine courts to supervise and to ensure lawful practices by agents of the 
political branches of government. 
In drafting the HSA, the Philippine lawmakers abstained from 
defining terrorism and instead listed which acts may be punishable under 
certain circumstances as acts of terrorism.200   By defining a punishable 
terrorist act as requiring the existence of “widespread and extraordinary fear 
and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in 
to an unlawful demand,”201 the HSA granted the Philippine judiciary sole 
discretion to decide which acts are punishable under terrorist liability.  
Assuming that Philippine judges are impartial and insulated from political 
bias, the HSA’s allocation of adjudicative decision-making to the judiciary 
and away from the political branches, in theory, adheres to the doctrine of 
the separation of powers.  This structure strengthens the 
compartmentalization of power within the Philippine government and 
provides for a legal check on executive abuse of power.   
The HSA also serves democratic ideals through the reviewability of 
the judicial process.  In 2008, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled on the 
supremacy of the writs of amparo and habeas data.202  The Court declared 
that the writ of amparo is “a remedy available to any person whose right to 
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an 
unlawful act . . . of a public official . . . [regarding] extralegal killings and 
enforced disappearances.”203  The writ of habeas data also applies to all 
aggrieved parties “whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is 
violated or threatened by an unlawful act . . . of a public official . . . engaged 
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the 
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”204  Unlike 
the secrecy surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the HSA makes 
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the prosecution of terrorists a transparent matter that proceeds under the 
supervision of the Philippine judiciary.  Also, actions executed under the 
HSA do not trump the writs of amparo or habeas data, so individual liberties 
may always be aggrieved through judicial recourse.  This opportunity for 
review strengthens the democratic ideal of “a government of the people, by 
the people.”205   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Challenged with enduring struggles for secession and growing 
terrorist networks, the Philippine Congress drafted the HSA to distinguish 
between punishing terrorists and punishing secessionists.  To punish a 
person under the HSA, a court must decide precisely when the actus reus 
accompanied the requisite attendant circumstances and whether there existed 
the required specific intent.  The HSA accomplishes its purpose of 
safeguarding the Philippine people from terrorist acts by expressly 
enumerating which actions are punishable, while allowing the judiciary to be 
the impartial bearer of the sword.   
The HSA is beneficial for Philippine democracy because it pivoted the 
country’s anti-terrorism policy toward the protection of human rights.  The 
Philippine legislature crafted the HSA in part to curb governmental abuse:  
thirty of the HSA’s sections expressly punish governmental overreaching.  
Philippine Senator Pimentel reflected on the HSA’s dual purpose in his note 
that when read separately, sections of the HSA “may cause an intense 
societal anxiety,” but when read as a whole, “the readers may well find that 
there are remedies embedded in the Act that uphold the people’s human 
rights and civil liberties and afford them some defense from an oppressive 
government.”206  Thus, the HSA strengthens Philippine democracy because it 
facilitates the curbing of terrorism through the judiciary’s ensuring that the 
law is applied suaviter in modo, fortiter in re—gently in manner, strongly in 
deed. 
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